





















The gradual feminisation of politics owes much to the promotion of women’s representation by left parties. These parties do not only tend to be the best performers in this regard (Kittilson, 2006; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003) but their actions have also been found to instill a contagion process within their respective party systems (Matland and Studlar, 1996). Ideology is indeed one of the most relevant variables explaining the levels of women’s numerical representation attained by political parties (Caul, 1999). Firstly, left ideology espouses egalitarianism. In particular, left parties tend to support equality of outcome, thus being more sensitive to the exclusion of social groups and more likely to adopt gender quotas to redress the imbalance of power in political representation (Dahlerup, 2007; Kittilson, 2006; Krook, 2009). Secondly, connections to the feminist movement and women’s agency are usually stronger in left parties, which crucially contribute to the promotion of female candidates and to the adoption of gender quotas (Freidenvall, 2013; Jensen, 1995).
When examining women’s numerical or descriptive representation extant research has generally tended to overlook the diversity of the left block, with mainstream left-wing parties (Social Democratic) being much more researched than smaller left-wing parties, such as the Greens or radical left parties (RLPs). With the exception of Kittilson (2011), who analysed how women’s political presence within political parties and parliaments affects the welfare policies of various party families, including Green and Communist parties, attention has barely been paid to non-mainstream left parties. Still, the internal variance within these party families has not been examined. Simultaneously, studies on RLPs have tended to focus on their ideological, organisational and electoral evolution (Bull and Heywood, 1994; Keith, 2016; March, 2011), but their social representativeness and their commitment to women’s representation remains largely unexplored. Similarly, to the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive study has been undertaken in this regard either for Green parties. 
We argue that left ideology should not be taken at face value and that there is a need to scrutinize the degree of variation in the representation of women in non-mainstream left parties, that is, in both Green and RLPs. In this article we provide a comparative survey of how the ideological diversity among these parties shapes the strategies that they adopt to achieve equality in terms of gender representation. By investigating the implementation of party strategies and their results in terms of gender outcomes, this article provides the first comprehensive account of radical left and Green parties in the field of women’s descriptive representation that may be informative for both party politics and gender politics scholars.
In particular, we explore how the diverse ideological background of the radical left and the Greens leads to varied ways of engaging with feminism, diverse forms of organising women within their ranks as well as dissimilar positions towards gender quotas. These yield different levels of women’s numerical representation in public office and in party decision-making positions. In doing so we analyse a medium-sized sample of West European radical left and Green parties from various regions (Scandinavia, Northern Europe and Central Europe) to control for both party ideological features and cross-country socioeconomic and cultural traits. We find that, in general, parties from the same ideological subgroup more closely resemble one another than other parties from different regions. Our findings also show a significant convergence among the distinct party sub-groups in terms of their share of elected women for both party and public office. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section one surveys the patterns of women’s representation across non-mainstream left (sub)party families and discusses the theoretical expectations that may account for differences. Section two presents our data and method. Section three explores party strategies to promote women’s presence in party and public office. The last section discusses our main findings and outlines several avenues for further research.

Party ideology and women’s representation in Green and radical left parties
Party ideology not only defines a party’s identity or raison d’être but also informs its political strategies and shapes its organisational structure (Panebianco, 1988). Among other issues, ideology explains the extent to which gender equality scores highly in left parties’ programmatic beliefs and political agenda. As noted by Caul (2001: 1217), “A left party in general may not necessarily favor policies to support women, and New Left parties may be more amenable to implementing strategies to quickly promote women candidates”. Thus, the differences between New Left and Old Left parties are also expected to produce a dissimilar commitment to women’s representation. As argued by Lovenduski (1993: 8), “a commitment to women’s representation in party rhetoric may be the beginning of a process that will lead to more substantial policies of inclusion”. In what follows we discuss the main ideological stances of radical left and Green parties, including their engagement with feminism and defence of women’s rights, as well as their basic organisational characteristics which allows us to draw our expectations on how ideological differences are likely to shape party strategies towards women’s representation.
Green parties are known for electing high levels of women in parliaments and their New Left orientation makes them sensitive to the inclusion of under-represented groups in their party ranks (Caul, 1999: 94-5). Gender parity rules are considered to be a “genetic organizational principle” of Green parties (Rihoux, 2016: 300). Indeed, the rank-and-file of Green parties seems to have presented a low gender divide since the beginning (Byrne 1997: 75). For one thing, the Greens were influenced in their development by the women’s movement, for example through the latter’s active part in the part anti-nuclear power movement (Doherty, 2002: 40). As noted by Richardson (1995: 8) social justice, non-violence, decentralization, gender and racial equality, participatory democracy and individual human rights are central to the positions of Green parties. Feminism has a good fit with environmentalism since both movements “[do] not seek to capture the state and their challenge [is] as much cultural as material” (Doherty, 2002: 21), even if not all Green parties adhere to the same view of feminism (Ibid., p.55). 
Differences within the Green party family have been identified between ‘green-greens’ and ‘red-greens’ (March and Mudde, 2005: 32; Bomberg, 1998: 24), with the latter having even been identified by some authors as RLPs (Backes and Moreau, 2008). While the literature is silent on this issue, we can expect the ‘green-greens’ to be better performers as regards women’s representation since the exploitation of any demographic group gets the same emphasis as that of the working class. This notwithstanding, studies of ideological heterogeneity in European party families suggest that the Greens are the most ideologically homogenous group (Ennser, 2012: 162). 
How should we expect RLPs to compare to the Greens on the issue of women’s representation? First of all, RLPs are a “broad church”, including in Western Europe Conservative Communists, Reform Communists, and Democratic Socialists. These parties share a common emphasis on traditional left-wing policies and “root and branch” change of the political system and social structures (March, 2012: 316).1 Nonetheless, the different stances RLPs take towards New Politics issues have been found to play a key role in shaping their programmatic positions (Gómez et al., 2016). This is also likely to impact on their positions on gender equality and their strategies to achieve this goal. 
The so-called Conservative (or Marxist-Leninist) Communists keep Leninist democratic centralism as their organisational principle and are radically opposed to capitalism and liberal democracy. While retaining a nostalgic approach to the Soviet model, they more directly express anti-imperialism and seek to offer an alternative via revolution or an evolutionary process. These parties have been regarded as the least post-materialist among the radical left (March, 2012: 319). In contrast, Reform Communists have abandoned orthodox communist principles, embraced grass-roots democracy and partially adopted a new left agenda. These parties developed from traditional communist parties but have discarded Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet model, and combine concerns about economic equality with ‘new left’ issues such as ecology (March, 2011: 32). Reform Communists have embraced feminism and consider patriarchy as a separate form of oppression to capitalism that needs to be fought whereas Conservative Communists do not identify themselves in any way with feminism, which is considered to undermine class struggle. The rejection of communist orthodoxy is also shared by Democratic Socialists which “fully espouse ‘new left’ themes” with a strong emphasis on left libertarianism in regards to demands for participatory democracy and diverse lifestyles. Democratic Socialist parties advocate a non-dogmatic (and often non-Marxist) socialism that emphasizes local participation and substantive democracy. These parties tend to display left-libertarian stances that translate into support for gender equality and feminism. Indeed, Democratic Socialist parties are depicted as having synthesised economic, feminist and environmental critiques of capitalism (March, 2012: 316; see also March and Mudde, 2005). 
Overall, we may expect parties that emphasise not only social equality but also minority rights and gender equality issues to perform better in regard to women’s representation than parties which place emphasis on class struggle over other types of identity. Simultaneously, New Left parties’ support for gender equality may attract more female party members and be more closely linked to the women’s movement than Old Left parties (Jenson, 1995). More specifically, we expect the degree of commitment to women’s representation to vary among left parties in the following order, from higher to lower: the Greens, Democratic Socialists, Reform Communists, and finally Conservative Communists.
The ability and willingness of a party to respond to new demands is also constrained by its historical and ideological legacies (Kitschelt, 1994). In this vein, newer parties are more likely to enact measures to guarantee women’s representation (Caul, 2001: 1218). For one thing, they are in need of establishing electoral support from anew and they may target female voters through programmatic appeals and policy measures that champion gender equality. Furthermore, their lower levels of institutionalization means that processes of quota adoption do not face strong organisational legacies that may result in potential resistance to policy innovation. In this case, newness would work to the advantage of Green, Democratic Socialist and Reform Communist parties since the former were created more recently than Conservative Communist parties or have experienced significant organisational renewal (Gómez et al., 2016). 
Other party organisational variables have also been found to be crucial in the promotion of women’s representation. In particular, the more centralised candidate selection processes are, the more control the party leadership has to initiate gender policies and to impose them upon all party levels (Kittilson, 2006; Kenny and Verge, 2013). Non-mainstream left parties vary significantly in the degree to which their candidate selection processes are centralised. Whereas emphasis in participatory democracy has led the Greens and Democratic Socialists to broaden the scope of intra-party democracy and to give more autonomy to local decision-making bodies (Müller-Rommel, 1998), Conservative and Reform Communists tend to have more centralised candidate selection processes (March, 2011: 118). As can be seen, there is a tension between a more favourable ideological position on gender equality and a crucial facilitating organisational factor that prevents us from deriving a specific expectation and that will have to be unpacked by the empirical analysis.

Data and methods
To examine the strategies developed by radical left and Green parties to increasing women’s representation, we have selected three countries per region in Western Europe, namely Scandinavia, Southern Europe and Northern Europe, those in which such parties have traditionally obtained seats in the national lower house. Table 1 presents our case studies by European region and ideological subgroup. Overall, the empirical analysis includes 17 case studies, including five parties from Southern Europe, six from Northern Europe and six from Scandinavia. This is a comprehensive sample of RLPs in Western Europe, following March’s (2012) classification, that allows us to count with a high degree of variance in our main independent variable – i.e. ideology. 
Our survey includes two Conservative Communists, two Reform Communists, eight Democratic Socialists, and five Green parties. This distribution largely reflects the composition of this broad party family in Western Europe (see March, 2012). In some countries, more than one radical left party is a relevant actor in the party system. This is the case of Portugal, Greece and Denmark. In other countries a radical left party and a green party coexist, such as in Germany, Sweden, Norway, France and the Netherlands. While this is also the case in Spain, the Green party has never obtained a seat in the national parliament on its own but has merged in the electoral tickets of other left-wing parties. In this case, we can only include one party.2
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The most direct indicator of a party’s commitment to gender equality in decision-making positions is the percentage of women’s representation in the national parliament. When examining radical left and Green parties that are often fringe parties, though, this might be a poor indicator, as these parties tend to have a low seat share. Accordingly, we will also measure the share of women’s representation in party decision-making bodies. We distinguish between the highest executive body (expanded leadership) and the secretariat (reduced leadership). While the former governs the party in-between conferences, the latter is in charge of its daily operation – typically including the party leader and deputy leaders as well as senior party officials who manage thematic areas. The data we present on women’s representation in public and party office reflects the situation as to June 2014.
The measurement of women’s representation will be coupled with other indicators. A variety of actions and strategies might help parties to achieve the goal of gender equality in political representation. These include equality promotion, namely the attempts to bring women into political competition through training programmes and other measures, and equality guarantees, that is, the introduction of gender quotas (Lovenduski, 1993: 9–11, 2005: 91). Equality promotion programmes are often run by women’s advocacy organisations within parties and such groups are also crucial in the lobbying for gender quotas. In Kittilson’s words (2006: 37), “the women’s organization provides a ready-made infrastructure for new demands for women’s presence among the party leadership and in parliament. In addition, the women’s organization holds an available pool of party women for leadership spots when they open up” (see also Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Wiliarty, 2010). 
For this reason we will pay special attention to women’s organisational structures in political parties, which might adopt multiple shapes. They typically grew as auxiliaries, sections or wings, nowadays adopting diverse forms (working groups, committees, loose networks, collateral organizations, etc.), and may be granted different representational rights in party decision-making bodies (Kittilson, 2011: 72; see also Kittilson, 2013). Concerning party gender quotas, the specialised literature has distinguished between ‘soft’ quotas – mandatory rules coded in party statutes – and ‘strong’ quotas – informal targets and recommendations (Krook et al., 2006). 
Due to the dearth of existing data on radical left and Green parties, the empirical analysis mainly adopts an inductive qualitative approach building on both party documents and in-depth interviews. While party statutes and conference resolutions provide us with the formal party rules and the programmatic aspirations of a party, interviews with key party informants can reveal the situation in practice. We interviewed, on average, two or three informants per party between June and July 2014 (with a few earlier interviews in 2013), either by telephone or skype and less frequently through e-mail correspondence. Interviewees were selected among senior representatives from women’s sections – mostly the current leaders, party officials and female elected officials (see Appendix 1). Informants were chosen because of their ability to provide information of organisational processes within the parties and/or their connection to party debates surrounding women’s representation (as recommended by Tansey, 2007). This provided information on the parties’ efforts to promote the representation of women and on how these efforts were affected by informal practices and organisational changes.

Party strategies and gender outcomes
Our sampled radical left and Green parties present significant variance in their location in two different ideological continuums, one of them capturing the classical socio-economic left-right scale and the other one measuring parties’ degree of left-libertarianism on personal freedoms – such as access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. As can be seen in Figure 1, Conservative and Reform Communists are the parties located furthest to the left but they espouse the weakest left-libertarian values. In contrast, Greens are placed more towards the centre-left but are the most left-libertarian. For their part, Democratic Socialists tend to fall in between the other party subgroups: they are more leftist than the Greens but less so than the two Communist subgroups while being more libertarian than the Communists but still less so than the Greens. Figure 1 also shows that the Green parties studied here are closer to one another than to RLPs in ideological terms in both axes. We find relatively little variation between the ‘red-green’ parties (such as the Dutch GroenLinks and the German Die Grünen) and ‘green-green’ parties (such as the French Les Verts and the Swedish Miljöpartiet de Gröna. The following section examines how distinct ideological traditions shape parties’ equality promotion and equality guarantees strategies. 
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We now turn to examining the extent to which the ideological diversity among non-mainstream left parties produces different levels of women’s representation in regards to both equality promotion and equality guarantees. 

Equality promotion
A more feminised membership might lead to a stronger women’s collective agency within the party, which plays a crucial role in pressing parties for numerical increases in women’s representation and for engendering the party platforms (Kittilson, 2013: 540; see also Lovenduski and Norris, 1993). As shown in Table 2, women represent on average 37% of members in the parties under examination. Greens (43%) and Democratic Socialists (43%) have higher proportions of female members than Reform Communists (35%). Conservative Communists have the lowest proportion of women members (26%), partly due to the extremely low female membership of the Greek KKE (18%). The only parties with more female than male members are the Greens in Norway and Sweden and the Democratic Socialist parties in Norway (SV) and Denmark (SF), as shown in Table 3.
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Concerning women’s organisational structures, Green parties have been more active in giving women’s sections formal roles in their party structures. For example, in Germany Die Grünen’s formal rules ensure that representatives from the women’s committee sit in the party leadership. In the Norway Greens the women’s committee also has a seat in meetings of the parliamentary group. Similarly, while the chair of the Sweden Green’s Gender Equality Committee does not sit in the party executive board, there is an official in the party leadership responsible for the Committee that grants the latter regular contact with the party’s secretary-general and decision makers in parliament. 
However, most of the women’s sections in our case studies are working groups. These rely largely on informal contacts with the party leadership and parliamentarians to lobby for influence and typically have little to none formal role in party statutes. Their primary role is to foster intra-party debates on women’s rights and gender equality and to mobilise female members. It is common for the groups to hold their own conferences and meetings to help women to network within their parties (for example SV in Norway, IU in Spain – where the coordinator of the women’s working group also sits in the expanded leadership body but has no voting rights – and Syriza in Greece). Most groups, though, are relatively small, with between 20-50 active members and several hundred subscribers to their newsletters. Most of the parties that we studied have women’s or feminist groups that are largely reserved for women. Besides the Swedish Greens, men can also participate in the activities of such groups in the French Les Verts and the Swedish Left Party.
	Some parties, like the Swedish Left Party (V), an overtly feminist party, have deliberately avoided having a formal women’s sub-party organisation until very recently (2012). In the words of a member of the party board this was to prevent a situation whereby ‘feminist politics and every issue affecting women becomes an issue only for women (…) that never has any influence on the party’. In response to this dilemma, Green parties, and in particular the ‘green-green’ parties in Sweden and Norway, have been most active in developing groups that address gender issues rather than being explicitly reserved as a space for women. The Swedish Greens, for example, sought to avoid hiving gender issues off to a women’s network by linking the Gender Equality Committee to the party leadership by including men in leadership positions of such a committee.   
Only three of the case studies do not currently have a women’s section although they used to have it in the past, namely the Conservative Communist KKE (Greece) and the Democratic Socialists SP (Netherlands) and SF (Denmark). In the latter, interviewees argued that it was no longer needed since the party did well in terms of representing women. According to our interviewees, the Greek KKE also had a strong women’s section in the 1990s, although this is no longer active and many feminist activists have largely abandoned the party and joined its rival Syriza. 
	Several of the women’s sections studied here have a high level of autonomy from their parties. For example, the leaders or coordinators of the women’s sections are chosen by their members (GroenLinks, Syriza, IU and RGA) rather than by the party leadership. This entails that many of these groups do not have formalised roles in the party leadership or other party bodies (excluding GroenLinks and IU). In some parties the leading figures of the women’s sections belong to the party leadership, as in V (Sweden) and Die Grünen (Germany), and their leaders are elected by the party conference. Sometimes, though, representatives from the women’s committees sit in the party executive by coincidence rather than because they have a formal role (RGA in Denmark). On other occasions, the leader of the women’s section is not included in the party leadership but an official from the leadership coordinates its work with the women’s section. This is the case in the Swedish Greens. However, such a relationship can become problematic because it leads to overlapping responsibilities and it might become involved in wider factional struggles within the party. This is why the Spanish IU abandoned having a women’s secretary in the party leadership in 2008, with the support of the women’s working group. Only the women’s sections of Swedish parties (both V and Greens), the Norway Greens and the Portuguese PCP have their leaders appointed by the party leadership. The Gender Equality Committee in the Sweden Greens has found some advantages from this procedure, in that this person can speak on gender issues in the media for the whole party rather than just for the Committee. 
	Few of the women’s sections have their own budgets. It is commonplace for these groups to have to apply to the central party office for funding campaigns or meeting, as in the Norway Greens, Syriza (Greece), IU (Spain), and SV (Norway). The women’s sections in the RGA (Denmark) and GroenLinks (Netherlands) have small budgets much like their parties’ other informal working groups. The small size of the parties regularly constrains their ability to fund women’s networks, which are regularly in direct competition with other party working groups for funds. In contrast, women’s sections have their own budgets in the German Die Grünen, the Sweden Greens and the Swedish Left Party (V).3 Funding presents a significant challenge for networks and limits their ability to promote the representation of women and gender issues. Due to a lack of funds, women’s groups struggle to hold meetings across the country, making it hard for activists to attend meetings. Most of them largely rely on voluntary labour from activists – with the exception of the Swedish Greens. 
	Women’s sections in Green, Democratic Socialist and Reform Communist parties have some influence over policy making. This is rather informal through campaigning at party conferences as in V (Sweden), where the feminist network works primarily to mobilise women and to educate activists about feminism more than contributing to policy making in a formal sense, since most working groups are in charge of drafting pledges on women’s issues for party manifestos, like in RGA (Denmark), BE (Portugal), IU (Spain) and Syriza (Greece). The women’s sections also have formal roles in policy making on gender issues in the Swedish and German Greens. Other than policy making, women’s sections in left parties also perform a range of other functions which have shaped their parties’ approach to gender equality. These groups write their parties’ documents on feminism and some publish research on the representation of women. 
	The groups have also worked to promote the representation of women in their parties. For example, when the leadership of the Danish RGA failed to include women in its initial delegation to the Party of the European Left, the women’s section campaigned to change its decision and argued that such delegations were important to train women politicians. The women’s section also campaigned for a quota of 40% women in the party leadership. When its proposals were rejected by the party conference, it closed down in protest until its activists succeeded in getting the quota passed in 2005. In the Norwegian SV the women’s committee successfully campaigned to get its leader represented in the party’s national board and took the lead in calling for quotas. Other women’s sections have faced an uphill struggle or been defeated in their calls for the introduction of more demanding quotas. For example in Syriza (Greece), the suggestions for 50:50 quotas by the women’s committee were rejected at the 2014 party conference. Similarly, in the Danish RGA, the women’s section continues to call for quotas for public office. 
	Only a few the parties studied here ran training or skills-building workshops for women candidates. These include the parties in Sweden (V and Greens), Die Grünen in Germany, and SV in Norway. Die Grünen and SV also include a mentoring programme by top female politicians. Women’s sections in left parties have been more active in running training sessions for women. Some organise meetings to allow opportunities for networking and to encourage women to stand as electoral candidates, especially at the local level as in RGA (Denmark), IU (Spain), Syriza (Greece), GroenLinks (Netherlands). Most groups, however, are more active in providing media skills or public speaking (as in Swedish V, Norwegian Greens and Dutch GroenLinks). Some groups also organise sessions aimed at countering high dropout rates for women politicians (V and Greens in Sweden).
	Overall, Green and Democratic Socialist parties have gone the furthest in advancing equality promotion thereby allowing for a stronger women’s agency within the party organisation. This ranges from proportions of women members to the autonomy and funding of women’s sections as well as training offered to aspirant women and female candidates. They are followed by Reform Communists and Conservative Communists come last.

Equality guarantees
Non-mainstream left parties significantly differ in the type of gender quotas that they use, as summarized in Table 3. Immediately or very soon after their emergence, each of the Green parties under examination set a parity quota aiming at an equal representation of women and men in both party bodies and electoral lists. They have also led innovation in quota design, the Green party family being the one in which the zipping system is more extensively applied – where women and men alternate throughout the list. Some of these parties, like the German Die Grünen, have even gone beyond the strict alternation of candidates of male and female candidates and established that lists must always be headed by a woman (the so-called 50%+1 quota). The exception is the Dutch GroenLinks, which resisted the introduction of positive action until 1991 when target figures and guidelines for gender-balanced representation, which are effectively followed (Voerman and Lucardie, 2016: 150), were preferred over stronger quotas.4 Overall, an effective application of gender quotas has allowed all Green parties to elect high proportions of women legislators, irrespective of their party magnitude, compared to the other left parties.
Earlier quotas were also adopted by Democratic Socialist parties in the late 1970s or early 1980s, sometimes even before the emergence of Green parties across Western Europe. Some of them set the first quotas at female membership levels (V in Sweden) while others already started at 40% (SF, Denmark; SV, Norway). Some left parties such as the RGA and SF (until 1999) adopted quotas for their national leaderships even when such quotas were rare in Denmark, as noted by our interviewees. As to South European Democratic Socialist parties, the BE’s (Portugal) party statutes set a 50% goal with no less than a third of positions allotted to women while Syriza’s (Greece) ‘soft’ quota fixes a minimum proportion of 1/3 women candidates. It should be noted that they are the best performers as regards the election of women deputies in their respective national parliaments (Verge, 2013: 445). 

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Reform Communists have put forward varied strategies. Whereas the Spanish IU has adopted strong quotas, with percentages evolving from 25% to 50% (zipping), the French PCF introduced a target in 1995 that was not coded in party statutes but appeared in the party platform as a commitment to move towards equality in representation. In both cases, though, poor electoral results have strongly affected their levels of elected female legislators. The Democratic Socialist party Die Linke (Germany) also uses quotas. The first two places and then every other place on these lists are reserved for women. In boards, committees and delegations, half of the members must be women. Thanks to this quota, Die Linke, scores highly on women’s representation (see Table 3).
Conservative Communists are more skeptical about gender quotas. They conceptualise the inequalities faced by women as a side effect of capitalism. Since fighting capitalism is their primary concern, gender inequality is to be fought in the socioeconomic arena, not in politics. This is the case of the KKE (Greece) which only used a gender quota for decision-making party bodies between 1990 and 1996. It is no coincidence that since a split in 1991, the KKE has taken more orthodox Marxist-Leninist positions. Yet, the KKE was the best performer in terms of elected women to parliament until Synaspismos (Syriza’s predecessor) gained seats in the 1996 elections. Between 2004 and 2009, though, the KKE elected more women deputies than Syriza. In Portugal, up to 2005, the PCP elected more women in the Portuguese lower house than any other party thanks to an informal target for women’s representation. 
	Overall, we find that most (ten) of the parties we studied have quotas for both parliamentary elections and their national leadership bodies. A further three parties use quotas for their decision-making bodies (Syriza in Greece, RGA in Denmark and Grønne in Norway) and two for elections (PCF in France and PCP in Portugal, before the respective legislative quotas were passed). Only two parties did not use quotas of any kind: the KKE (Greece) and the SP (Netherlands). Our interviewees, though, suggested that selection committees in the SP do at least aim to ‘balance’ candidate lists and that gender is one consideration taken into account, albeit to a limited extent. 
Moreover, radical left and Green parties have been active in calling for legislative electoral gender quotas for women’s representation in politics in their respective countries and submitting bills for their introduction, such as IU In Spain and the BE in Portugal. The PCF and Les Verts in France and Syriza in Greece supported the introduction of a legislative quota (passed in 2002 in France and in 2009 in Greece) and they have been one of the few parties within their party system effectively complying with it (Murray, 2010; Verge, 2013). In Germany, Die Grünen has called for strengthening the representation of women in politics through legislative quotas, which have not yet been adopted. In the Netherlands, GroenLinks has also recently called for corporate boards quotas.
	How does this translate into women’s representation in national parliaments? Green parties 53% (excluding the Greens in Norway which only have one member of parliament) and Democratic Socialists (41%) score highest. Reform Communists (25%) and Conservative Communists (23%) come much lower (see Table 2). How does the degree of centralisation of candidate selection process impact on levels of women representatives? In line with their emphasis on participatory democracy, Green parties tend to have very decentralised selection processes with very inclusive selectorates but still high levels of women representatives are achieved, which suggests that parity in representation has been entrenched in the party organisational culture. 
In sharp contrast, Conservative Communists’ selection processes are rather centralised, with the central party approving or ratifying party lists and even directly nominating the candidates for top positions on lists, as in the PCP (Portugal). These parties, however, have low levels of women’s representation across all groups, which may be an indicator of the party leadership’s low commitment to gender equal representation and also reflects our finding that levels of women’s agency are weakest in these parties. As for Reform Communists, both the IU (Spain) and the PCF (France) officially have rather decentralised selection processes but ratification by the highest executive body still secures control by the central level. Their rather poor electoral results may also partially contribute to their low levels of women’s representation.
Some Democratic Socialist parties have selection processes where the central party leadership also plays a prominent role in list-building, in some cases due to their historical legacy as coalitions, such as the BE (Portugal) and Syriza (Greece). In the SF (Denmark) the central party must approve the candidates nominated by the lower echelons. Other Democratic Socialist parties have more decentralised selection processes, such as the SV (Norway) and V (Sweden) where the central party elite cannot overturn selection decisions made by lower party levels. And yet, varied gender outcomes are found among Democratic Socialists using decentralised (high in V but low in SV) and centralised selection processes (high in BE and low in Syriza).
With regards to the share of women in the reduced party executive body (see Table 2), Greens also take the lead (49%) in this case along with Reform Communists (50%). Democratic Socialists come next (45%) and Conservative Communists show the lowest proportion (19%). Data on women’s presence in parties’ extended executive bodies reflects a slightly different rank order – Reform Communists (48%), Democratic Socialists (45%), Greens (43%) and Conservative Communists (23%). Some Green parties, such as the German Die Grünen, the French Les Verts and the Norwegian Grønne, as well as the German Die Linke have also introduced a dual presidency, with one man and one woman taking the party chair or spokesperson role – in the German Greens an all-women presidency is also allowed.
Most parties with quotas at the parliamentary or national leadership level fulfill them. However, we do find several failures to meet targets by both Green and RLPs, either in public office or party leadership positions. These include the German Die Linke (expanded leadership); the Dutch GroenLinks (reduced leadership); the Swedish Greens (expanded leadership); the Norwegian Greens (expanded leadership); the Spanish IU (in parliament); and the Norwegian SV (in parliament). Very often commitments to parity conflict with power struggles between the different currents within political parties (Allwood and Khursheed, 2000: 70). This has been the case (at least) of the French Les Verts, the Spanish IU and the Danish RGA. Factional leaders, who tend to be mostly male, distribute the top positions in party decision-making bodies and electoral lists among themselves, which has occasionally led to these parties failing to meet their own gender quotas.

Conclusions
The comprehensive survey on radical left and Green parties in Western Europe has shown that ideological legacies shape parties’ strategies to equal gender representation in regards to both equality promotion and equality guarantees. While the Greens are the trailblazers over women’s representation, with no significant differences found between ‘green-greens’ and ‘red-greens’, RLPs are more diverse, with some still preferring to put class issues to the forefront, like Conservative Communists. Where the rhetorical commitment with feminism is higher, stronger quotas are used. Yet, it should be highlighted that Democratic Socialists are neck to neck with the Greens, and Reform Communists are not that far behind. This is not surprising since New Politics has also taken root in these parties, especially in the former. This convergence within and among most radical left and Green parties may also be explained by developments at the European level. Both the European Green Party (integrated by both green-green and red-green parties such as the Dutch GroenLinks and the German Die Grünen) and the Party of the European Left (integrated by both Reform Communists such as the IU and the PCF, as well as the Democratic Socialists Syriza, BE, Die Linke and RGA), require every member party to send a two-person gender-balanced delegation and use gender quotas for the composition of the decision-making bodies. 
		Green parties have been more active in giving women’s sections formal roles in their party structures while we also find significant variation in the strength and degree of autonomy of women’s sections in RLPs. Women’s sections in Democratic Socialist and Reform Communist parties play a more relevant role within their organisations, especially with regards to drafting policy proposals than in Conservative Communists. Thus, our research confirms that a stronger women’s agency, measured here by the formal connections to the party and representation rights in party decision-making bodies, is key in pushing parties to commit to greater women’s numerical representation in both party and public office through the introduction and effective compliance with gender quotas. 
Overall, our findings highlight that scholars analysing women’s descriptive representation should not overlook the diversity of the non-mainstream left block. Radical left and Green parties might present similar characteristics, such as small party magnitudes. Yet, their gender outcomes in political representation are to a large extent determined by their dissimilar ideological traits and legacies. Indeed, parties from particular ideological subgroups resemble one other more closely than parties from the same region. Our findings also show a significant convergence among the distinct party sub-groups.
Further research could pay attention to Eastern and Central European RLPs. This would provide opportunities to examine Left Populist parties. Left populism has been defined as “primarily inclusionary (focused on policies of economic, cultural and political incorporation)” (March, 2014: 9), which involves attention to women’s status. However, as Mudde and Kaltwasser (2015) note in their study of Latin American Left Populist parties, local cultural factors and traditions might trump the promotion of gender equality. This may indeed be the case of the Eastern and Central European region where the equal political representation imposed by the preceding Communist regimes and their hollow commitment to women’s emancipation has produced negative attitudes towards gender quotas (Rashkova and Zankina, 2013).






1. Populist Left parties – including both Populist Socialists and Social Populists – also belong to the radical left party family but this category is left without cases in Western Europe as the German Die Linke has become increasingly difficult to differentiate from Democratic Socialist parties (Gómez et al., 2016: 355; March, 2011: 30).
2. Spain has recently seen the emergence of a Left Populist party, namely Podemos (We Can). However, it is excluded here as it had no seats in parliament at the time of carrying out our fieldwork.
3. Funding women’s sections has been easier in Swedish left parties because the state provides political parties with funding for organising women’s groups.
4. However, important figures from the women’s section, including its former chair, argue that quotas might become necessary as women have been underrepresented in leading party positions in recent years.
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 Tables and Figures

Table 1. Left parties by region and ideological subgroup

	Southern Europe	Northern Europe	Scandinavia
Conservative Communist	PCP – Portugal KKE – Greece		
Reform Communist	IU – Spain	PCF – France	
Democratic Socialist	BE – PortugalSyriza – Greece	SP – NetherlandsDie Linke – Germany	V – SwedenSF – DenmarkRGA – DenmarkSV – Norway
Greens		Verts – FranceDie Grünen*– GermanyGroenLinks* – Netherlands	Miljöpartiet de Gröna – SwedenGrønne – Norway

Notes: * ‘Red-greens’; ‘green-greens’ otherwise.
Acronyms:
Spain: IU (Izquierda Unida/United Left); Portugal: BE (Bloco de Esquerda/Left Block), PCP (Partido Comunista de Portugal/Communist Party of Portugal); Greece: KKE (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas/Communist Party of Greece), Syriza (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás/Coalition of the Radical Left); France: PCF (Parti Communiste Français/Communist Party of France), Les Verts (Greens); Denmark: RGA (Enhedslisten-De Rød-Grønne/Red-Green Alliance); SF (Socialistisk Folkeparti/Socialist People’s Party); Sweden: V (Vänsterpartiet/Left Party), Miljöpartiet de Gröna (Greens); Norway: SV (Sosialistisk Folkeparti/Socialist People’s Party), Grønne (Greens); Netherlands: SP (Socialistische Partij/Socialist Party); GroenLinks (Greens); Germany: Die Linke (The Left); Die Grünen (Greens). Syriza is included as a Democratic Socialist party, notwithstanding recent research that points to its increasing tendency to make populist appeals (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014).

Table 2. Representation of women by party subgroups (averages include sampled parties)












Table 3. Strategies and gender outcomes by political party

Party family	Party name	Quota reforms	Application(party office and/or elections)	Parliamentary group	Women in reduced leadership	Women in expanded leadership	Female members
Reform Comm.	IU1(Spain)	1987 – 25% (PCE)1989 – 25%; 1990 – 35%; 1997 – 40/60%2004 – Zipping (recommended); 2008 - Zipping (mandatory) + half the electoral lists must be headed by women	Both 	29%(2011)	50%	45%	32%
Reform Comm.	PCF2(France)	1995- Informal target for women’s representation (applied since 1994)* 	Elections	20%(2012)	50%	50%	37%
Conservative Comm.	PCP3 (Portugal)	Informal target for women’s representation*	Elections	19%(2011)	15%	25%	33%
Conservative Comm.	KKE4(Greece)	1990-1996: 1/3 of women for party office	None	27%(2012)	22%	21%	18%
Democratic Soc.	BE3(Portugal)	50% goal – Since the creation of BE	Both	50%(2011)	33%	37%	32%
Democratic Soc.	Syriza4(Greece)	33% (1/3) – Since the creation of the party	Party office	33%(2012)	22%	35%(2007)	35%
Democratic Soc.	V(Sweden)	1978 – As many women as female party members1987 – As many women as female party members1990 – A minimum of 40% of each sex 1993 – A minimum of 50% women 	Party officeBothBothBoth	58%(2010)	57%	61%	48%
Democratic Soc.	SF(Denmark)	40% quota introduced in 1977 and abandoned in 1996. Candidate quotas for the European Parliament adopted in 1983 (of 40%), abandoned 1990. Candidate quotas for parliament and local elections only for the period 1988-1990. Soft non-formalised quotas thereafter*	Both	58%(2011)	44%(2007)	NA	52%
Democratic Soc.	RGA(Denmark)	2003 – At least 40% from each gender	Party office	33%(2011)	57%	50%	45%
Democratic Soc.	SV(Norway)	Since 1975, SV has had a 40 percent quota for both sexes for all levels in party bodies. Zipping applied to electoral lists	Both	29%(2013)	53%	68%	55%
Democratic Soc.	SP(Netherlands)	None	None	33%(2012)	NA	25.7%	40%
Democratic socialist	Die Linke(Germany)	The first two and then every other place in lists are reserved for women. In boards, committees and delegations, half of the members should be women 	Both	53%(2013)	50%	41%	36%
Greens	Die Grünen(Germany)	1986 – 50%Currently 50%+1 (women also head the lists + dual presidency)	Both	54%(2013)	50%	50%	40%
Greens	Verts2(France)	1984 – Equal representation of women and men	Both	53%(2012)	47%	NA	33%
Greens	GroenLinks(Netherlands)	1991 – Target figures* 2013 – At least half of all elective and party positions should be for women*	Both	50%(2012)	29%	NA	41%
Greens	Miljöpartiet de Gröna (Sweden)	1981 – Gender balance1987 – Zipping in electoral lists 	Party officeBoth	56%(2010)	62%	47%	51%
Greens	Grønne (Norway)	Any party body must have at least 40% of men and women. Executive committee: one spokesperson from each sex 	Party office	0 (the party has only one seat)(2013)	56%	32%	50%

Source: Party informants and party and national parliaments’ websites. Data also obtained from several secondary sources: Allwood and Khursheed (2000); Dahlerup (2013); Freidenvall, et. al. (2006); Freidenvall (2013); Geissel (2008); Murray (2010). Pantelidou Maloutas (2007); Quotaproject (2014); Steindhorst (2014); Verge (2013). 
1 The legislative quota in Spain (2007) establishes party lists must include no less than 40% and no more than 60% of either sex – a proportion to be met as well in each stretch of five candidates.2 The legislative quota in France (2002, revised in 2007) mandates parties must field an equal proportion (50%) of men and women candidates. 3 The legislative quota in Portugal (2006) establishes that party lists must include at least a third of candidates of either sex and no sex shall occupy more than two consecutive positions. 4 In Greece the legislative quota (2008) mandates parties to field at least a third of candidates of either sex.







Figure 1. Left parties’ location by ideological subgroup

Source: Data from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015).
Ideological stance on economic issues: 0 = Extreme left to 10 Extreme right.
Libertarianism positions: 0 = Libertarian/Postmaterialist to 10 Traditional/Authoritarian.


Appendix 1. List of interviewees

Party	Country	ID	Function	Date
IU	Spain	R1	Coordinator of the women’s working group 	17/06/2014
IU (PCE)	Spain	R2	Party Women’s Secretary in PCE and member of IU’s expanded executive	2/07/2014
IU	Spain	R3	Party secretary for programmatic action	06/06/2014
PCP	Portugal	R5	Member of the Central Committee	12/07/2014
BE	Portugal	R6	Former MEP and member of the Political Commission	10/07/2014
BE	Portugal	R6	Member of the Central Committee	11/07/2014
Syriza	Greece	R7	Member of the Feminist Policy and Gender  secretariat	5/06/2014
Syriza	Greece	R8	Former MEP and member of the Feminist Policy & Gender  secretariat	5/06/2014
Syriza	Greece	R9	Former candidate in national elections and linked to the activities of the Feminist Policy & Gender section	10/06/2014
Die Grünen	Germany	R10	Former member of parliament	30/06/2014
Die Grünen	Germany	R11	Party Secretary for women’s issues	16/07/2014
GroenLinks	Netherlands	R12	Organisational Secretary Femnet	15/08/2014
GroenLinks	Netherlands	R13	Former chair Femnet, member of the Senate	21/08/2014
GroenLinks	Netherlands	R14	MP	25/08/2014
V	Sweden	R15	Gender spokesperson, Board member of the party	21/08/2014
Grønne	Norway	R16	Substitute MP	21/08/2014
SF	Denmark	R17	Party advisor concerning gender equality	20/08/2014
SF	Denmark	R18	Party International Secretary	24/08/2014






SP 	Netherlands	R25	Party General Secretary (email correspondence)	27/07/2014
SV	Norway	R26	Party Secretary	13/11/2013
SV	Norway	R27	Coordinator women’s committee	12/07/2014
SV	Norway	R28	Board leader (email correspondence)	11/08/2014
SV	Norway	R29	Chairperson	09/11/2013
Gronne	Norway	R30	Coordinator women’s committee (email correspondence)	28/08/2014
RGA	Denmark	R31	Organiser of the women’s network	26/07/2014
RGA	Denmark	R32	MP/spokesperson gender issues	26/06/2014
RGA	Denmark	R33	International Secretary	13/11/2013
RGA	Denmark	R34	European Left Board Member/EL-Fem member	18/07/2014
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